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PUBLICATION ETHICS AND PUBLICATION MALPRACTICE
STATEMENT
ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR JOURNAL PUBLICATION
The publication of the peer-reviewed journal Annual Survey of
South African Law contributes to the growth of knowledge.
Therefore, all participants — authors, editors, peer reviewers,
and the publisher — agree on standards of proper ethical
behaviour. The University of South Africa and Juta and Co Ltd,
who are respectively responsible for producing and publishing
the journal, recognise the ethical and other responsibilities and
take our guardianship of the functions connected with the publi-
cation of the journal very seriously.
DUTIES OF AUTHORS
The authors undertake to present an accurate and current
account of legislative and judicial developments and to provide
objective discussion. The material must contain sufficient detail
and permit others to replicate the work. Making fraudulent or
knowingly inaccurate statements is unacceptable. Work reflect-
ing editorial opinion must be acknowledged as such.
The work must be original, and where the work/words of others
have been used this must be appropriately quoted or cited.
Plagiarism in any form is unethical behaviour, and unacceptable.
Authors are not permitted, in general, to publish manuscripts
conveying the same research in more than one journal. Submit-
ting the same manuscript to more than one journal for publication
is unethical and unacceptable, save in exceptional circum-
stances where the authors have sought approval from the editor
for publication of the same material in a secondary publication, in
which case the primary reference must be cited in the secondary
publication.
If an author discovers that his or her published work contains
an inaccuracy, he or she must promptly notify the editor, and
cooperate with the editor to excise or correct the content. If the
editor is informed of an inaccuracy by a third party, the author
must promptly retract or correct the manuscript, or prove that the
original content is correct.
DUTIES OF EDITORS
The editors of the Annual Survey of South African Law are
responsible for deciding whether chapters submitted for publica-
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tion should be accepted. They may be guided by policies of the
editorial board. The editor-in-chief may confer with the other
editors in making a final determination.
The editors must ensure that contributions to the journal appear
in correct English which complies with the style-guidelines pre-
scribed for the journal. The editors evaluate the intellectual
content of manuscripts without regard to gender, race, religious
belief, sexual orientation, citizenship, ethnic origin or the political
inclinations of the authors.
The editorial board will not disclose any information about
chapters submitted for publication to anyone other than the
corresponding author, reviewers, and the publisher as appro-
priate.
Unpublished material submitted by authors may not be used in
the editor’s own research without consent from the author. Editors
must disclose competing interests and publish corrections if the
conflicts of interest are discovered after publication. If required,
other action must be taken, such as retraction of the manuscript
and expression of concern.
The editors take responsibility to respond to ethical complaints
concerning a submitted manuscript or chapter published in the
Annual Survey of South African Law. Any reported complaint,
even if submitted years after publication, will be investigated and
appropriate measures will be taken.
DUTIES OF REVIEWERS
The objective peer review process assists the editor in chief in
making editorial decisions, and in improving the quality of the
chapters. Peer review is a key component of scholarly communi-
cation and ensures sound standards of research and proper
acknowledgment of sources used.
Unpublished materials contained in an unpublished manu-
script may not be used in the reviewer’s own research without the
consent of the author. Reviewers must disclose any possible
conflict of interests that may exist, and recuse themselves from
reviews in instances where such a conflict exists.
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
ANDRA LE ROUX-KEMP*
LEGISLATION
CRIMINAL MATTERS AMENDMENT ACT 18 OF 2015
The Criminal Matters Amendment Act 18 of 2015 was pub-
lished in Government Gazette 39522 of 15 December 2015 and
aims to amend and regulate miscellaneous matters relating to
essential infrastructure-related offences. Essential infrastructure
is defined in section 1 of the Amendment Act as ‘any installation,
structure, facility or system, whether publicly or privately owned,
the loss or damage of, or the tampering with, which may interfere
with the provision or distribution of a basic service to the public’.
The commencement date of this Act has not yet been pro-
claimed.
CRIMINAL LAW (SEXUAL OFFENCES AND RELATED MATTERS)
AMENDMENT ACT AMENDMENT ACT 5 OF 2015
The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters)
Amendment Act Amendment Act 5 of 2015 came into operation
on 7 July 2015 (GG 38977). The Act amends the Criminal Law
(Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of
2007 to, inter alia, give presiding officers a discretion to decide
whether an offender’s particulars should be included in the
National Register for Sex Offenders, and to provide for a proce-
dure in terms of which certain persons may apply for the removal
of their particulars from this National Register. It also provides for
the removal of the particulars of child offenders who have been
convicted for having engaged in consensual sexual acts with one
another from the National Register.
CORRECTIONAL MATTERS AMENDMENT ACT 5 OF 2011
The President, by proclamation in the Government Gazette
(Proc 1 GG 38377 of 5 January 2015), determined 5 January
*BA LLB (Stell), CML (UNISA), LLD (Stell), BMus (UNISA) Hons BMus
(UNISA). Assistant Professor at the School of Law, City University of Hong Kong;
Visiting Research Scholar at the School of Law, University of the Witwatersrand.
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2015 as the date of commencement of section 9 of the Correc-
tional Matters Amendment Act 5 of 2011 insofar as it relates to
section 48 of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998. Section 9
of the Amendment Act deals with the management, safe custody
and well-being of remand detainees and matters related thereto.
LEGAL AID SOUTH AFRICA ACT 39 OF 2014
The Legal Aid South Africa Act 39 of 2014 came into operation
on 1 March 2015 as per Proclamation R7 Government Gazette
38512 of 27 February 2015.
FORENSIC DNA REGULATIONS, CRIMINAL LAW (FORENSIC
PROCEDURES) AMENDMENT ACT 37 OF 2013
The Forensic DNA Regulations pertaining to the Criminal Law
(Forensic Procedures) Amendment Act 37 of 2013 were published
on 13 March 2015 (GN R207 GG 38561). The regulations
provide, inter alia, for the procedure for the taking of DNA
samples, the keeping of records of collected buccal and crime
scene samples, the chain of custody of such samples, and the
conducting of comparative searches on the National Forensic
DNADatabase (NFDD). Article 13 of the regulations also provides
for the protocols and training related to familial searches to be
conducted on the NFDD, and articles 14 to 24 deal with the
lodging of complaints with the Forensic Oversight and Ethics
Board.
PREVENTION AND COMBATING OF TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS ACT 7 OF
2013
The date of commencement of the Prevention and Combating
of Trafficking in Persons Act 7 of 2013 is 9 August 2015 (Proc R32
GG 39078 of 7 August 2015). (This is save for ss 15, 16 and
31(2)(b)(ii) which will come into effect on a future date.) The
primary purpose of this Act is to give effect to South Africa’s
international obligations with regard to the combating and punish-
ment of trafficking in persons. The Act purports to do this by, inter
alia, creating statutory offences and penalties for trafficking in
persons and related offences. Administrative and procedural
matters for the coordination of efforts to prevent and combat the
trafficking of persons within and across the borders of South Africa
are also addressed.
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In the regulations published pursuant to the Act (GN R737
GG 39119 of 21 August 2015) provision is made for the process
and administration a prosecutor must use in referring suspected
victims of trafficking in persons in terms of section 22(2) of the
Act.
CASE LAW
THE NATIONAL PROSECUTING AUTHORITY
The legislative scheme for the South African National Prosecut-
ing Authority is based on the provisions of section 179(1) of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, (‘the Constitu-
tion’) and is given effect to by way of the National Prosecuting
Authority Act 32 of 1998.
The authority to prosecute in terms of the National Prosecuting Authority
Act 32 of 1998
Section 38 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998
provides for the appointment of persons with suitable qualifica-
tions and experience to perform certain services in specific
cases, including conducting a prosecution under the control and
direction of the National Director of Public Prosecutions or the
Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions. The constitutionality of
this provision was attacked in Moussa v S & another 2015 (2)
SACR 537 (SCA) (14 April 2015).
The appellant in this case was charged with sixteen counts of
fraud, and in the alternative, three counts of theft and three
counts of money laundering under the Prevention of Organised
Crime Act 121 of 1998 (para [1]). And, due to the nature of the
commercial transactions with which the appellant was charged,
the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) engaged the services of
an advocate in private practice, who is also a member of the
Pretoria Bar and a former prosecutor, to conduct the prosecution
in terms of section 38 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32
of 1998 (para [3]). The appellant challenged this appointed
prosecutor’s authority to prosecute on the ground that section 38
of the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998 is unconstitu-
tional as it permits the appointment of a prosecutor from outside
of the NPA’s normal staff complement and, therefore, does not
give effect to the constitutional principle enshrined in section 179(4)
of the Constitution which provides for a single independent NPA in
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South Africa, and which requires that the prosecuting authority
exercise its functions without fear, favour or prejudice (para [8]). The
appellant further argued that prosecutors appointed in terms of
section 38 of the National ProsecutingAuthority Act 32 of 1998 were
not required to take the oath as required by section 32(2) of the Act
and that this was ‘foundational to the independence of a prosecutor’
(para [12]).
Judge Nevsa, for the majority of the Supreme Court of Appeal,
stated that the practice of engaging persons with specialised
skills to assist in prosecutions is not ‘statutorily novel’ (paras
[13]-[15]; see paras [32]-[42] for a comparison with other jurisdic-
tions; and also see S v Tshotshoza & others 2010 (2) SACR 274
(GNP)). The statutory scheme providing for a prosecuting authority
in South Africa was found to be in line with the constitutional
imperative of ensuring independence, impartiality, and prosecu-
tion without fear, favour or prejudice. It was also found that the
current section 38 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of
1998 is in line with these objectives in that it ensures that the
appointment of persons with suitable qualifications and experi-
ence to perform prosecution-related services is restricted to
specific cases only, and then only after consultation at the highest
level involving the Minister, the National Director and/or Deputy
National Directors of Public Prosecutions (para [25]). Moreover,
once such persons have been appointed in terms of section 38 of
the Act, they must perform their duties under the control of these
NPA officials (para [25]). The argument that section 38 of the
National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998 undermines prose-
cutorial independence and impartiality could, therefore, not stand
(para [26]).
With regard to the submission that persons appointed under
section 38 of the Act are not required to take the oath as provided
for in section 32, the court stated that ‘[i]t is not the taking of the
oath that guarantees prosecutorial independence and impartiality.
Nor can the taking of the oath by itself ensure an accused’s fair trial
rights. It is the manner in which prosecutions are initiated
and conducted that is the test of prosecutorial independence’
(para [29]).
In another case, Porritt & another v National Director of Public
Prosecutions & others [2015] 1 All SA 169 (SCA), the appellants
were charged with more than 3 000 counts involving contraven-
tions of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, the Companies Act 61 of
1973, and the Stock Exchanges Control Act 1 of 1985, as well as
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racketeering and fraud. The appellants first tendered a plea in
terms of section 106(1)(h) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of
1977 in the South Gauteng High Court, alleging that the prosecu-
tion team had no title to prosecute. This plea was based on a
number of grounds, including that the required consultation with
the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development had not
taken place in regard to the appointment of a suitably qualified
and experienced prosecutor in terms of section 38(1) of the
National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, and that the
appointment of the prosecutors breached the appellants’ fair trial
rights. It was also alleged that the appointment of the prosecutors
was in conflict with the provisions of section 32(1) of the National
Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998 which required, inter alia,
that prosecutors serve impartially and carry out their duties
without fear, favour or prejudice (paras [2] [3]).
In the South Gauteng High Court, Justice Mailula held that
there had indeed been proper consultation as required by the
National Prosecuting Authority Act and that there had been no
irregularities in the appointment of the first prosecutor. However, it
was found that the involvement of the second prosecutor in
drafting an affidavit in respect of a civil matter in which the
appellants were involved, did create a reasonable perception of
bias and partiality (para [4]). It was consequently ordered that the
two prosecutors be removed and that different prosecutors be
appointed if the NPA decided to continue with the case against
the appellants. The court a quo rejected the appellants’ plea that
they were entitled to be acquitted under section 106(4) once the
removal of the prosecutors had been ordered, and rather com-
pared section 106(1)(h) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
to the application for the recusal of a presiding officer: ‘The
proceedings in such a case [recusal of a presiding officer] are a
nullity, and the accused would not be entitled to demand either
‘‘conviction’’ or ‘‘acquittal’’ ’ (para [4]).
Justice Tshiqi, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court of
Appeal, agreed that the appellants were not entitled to an
acquittal in terms of section 106(1)(h) of the Criminal Procedure
Act 51 of 1977, but held that the court a quo had misdirected
itself in applying the test for the recusal of a judicial officer on the
grounds of apprehension or bias (see President of the Republic
of South Africa & others v South African Rugby Football Union &
others 1999 (4) SA 147 (CC)). She held that there was a
fundamental difference between the role and functions of a
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prosecutor and those of a magistrate or judge, and that the
principles governing prosecutorial conduct differ from those
applicable to presiding officers (paras [10]-[13] [21]). The correct
test to be applied in the current matter was formulated in Director
of Public Prosecutions, Western Cape v Killian 2008 (1) SACR
247 (SCA) 1332F–H where it was held that ‘unfairness does not
flow axiomatically from a prosecutor’s having a dual role’ (para
[18]). The order of the High Court removing the two prosecutors
was consequently set aside and the matter was remitted back to
the court a quo to proceed with the criminal trial (para [19]).
Immunity and liability of prosecutors
Section 42 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998
provides that ‘[n]o person shall be liable in respect of anything
done in good faith under this Act’. This provision came under
scrutiny in the case of Minister of Justice and Constitutional
Development v X 2015 (1) SACR 187 (SCA), a case that dealt
with an appeal against an order by the Western Cape High Court
declaring the appellant, a prosecutor, liable to the respondent for
the payment of damages arising out of the abduction and rape of
her five-year-old daughter (para [1]). This order was made
pursuant to a summons issued against the Minister of Safety and
Security and the appellant, based on their alleged negligence in
the hearing of the bail application of the rape offender in this
matter and which caused the rape offender to be released on his
own recognisance during which time he allegedly abducted the
respondent’s five-year-old daughter and raped her twice (paras
[6] [7]).
The alleged offender in the rape case bore the onus of proving
the existence of exceptional circumstances justifying his release
on bail in the interests of justice and in terms of section 60(11)(a)
of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (para [2]). During the
bail hearing the offender disclosed that he had previous convic-
tions including one for rape and four or five for assault but did not
provide any details, nor did the prosecutor pursue this under
cross-examination or present further evidence in this regard to
the court (para [26]). At the conclusion of the bail hearing, the
magistrate was extremely critical of the evidence (or lack thereof)
presented by the state and was also critical of the fact that the
prosecutor had not presented the court with a record of the
offender’s previous convictions (para [28]). No explanation was
ever tendered for the prosecutor’s failure to place all the relevant
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information before the magistrate (para [29]). This was also not
ameliorated in the subsequent bail hearing more than a month
thereafter (para [30]).
With reference to the case of Minister of Safety and Security &
another v Carmichele 2004 (3) SA 305 (SCA), Judge Fourie,
writing for the majority of the Supreme Court of Appeal, held that
a reasonable prosecutor would, in the prevailing circumstances,
undoubtedly have foreseen the reasonable possibility that if he or she
were to fail to place all relevant information before the magistrate, . . .
[the offender] . . . might be granted bail. [Moreover] . . . a reasonable
prosecutor would [also] have foreseen the reasonable possibility of
the . . . [the offender], . . . if released on bail, causing bodily injury to
vulnerable members of the community, particularly women and young
children (para [35]).
Judge Fourie also emphasised that section 42 of the National
ProsecutingAuthority Act 32 of 1998 ‘seeks to introduce a ground
of justification for conduct which is prima facie wrongful. There-
fore, wrongful conduct that would otherwise give rise to delictual
liability may be justified and rendered lawful by virtue of the
statutory immunity conferred in terms of section 42 of the National
Prosecuting Authority Act. It is a defence specifically directed at
the wrongfulness element of delictual liability’ (para [41]). How-
ever, the appellant in this case had not properly pleaded this
defence and, given the very late stage of the proceedings, it was
held that to allow for the appellant to raise the section 42 defence
at that point would be grossly unfair to the respondent (paras [43]
[44]). With reference to the case of Simon’s Town Municipality v
Dews & another 1993 (1) SA 191 (A) it was also held that a
prosecutor exercising the powers conferred in terms of section
20 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act, and wishing to avail
him- or herself of the immunity afforded by section 42, ‘is required
to show that he or she acted within the authority conferred by the
power in question, which, in turn, requires him or her to have
taken all reasonable precautions to avoid or minimize injury to
others. A failure to do so would render his or her conduct unlawful
and the reliance on section 42 of the NPAAct would therefore fail’
(para [52]). Furthermore, even if it was accepted that the prose-
cutor in this case had acted bona fide, it was held to be
‘abundantly clear that he had failed to use due care and to take all
reasonable precautions to avoid or minimize injury to the respon-
dent and her minor daughter’ (para [53]). The prosecutor was, for
this reason, precluded from relying on the ground of justification
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created by section 42 of the National ProsecutingAuthority Act 32
of 1998 (para [53]).
Also see Woji v Minister of Police 2015 (1) SACR 409 (SCA) in
which a police officer was held to be liable for damages to an
accused on the ground of wrongful detention in that the police
officer informed the court that the accused was clearly depicted
on a video as one of the bank robbers in question, even though
he was not. The court held that this amounted to a breach of the
public duty owed by a police officer to an accused, and the
general public at large. However, in Minister of Safety and
Security v Van der Walt & another 2015 (2) SACR 1 (SCA), it was
held that the magistrate was not liable for her negligent conduct
in this matter because, for reasons of public and legal policy, a
magistrate’s conduct, when performing his or her judicial func-
tions, is not regarded as wrongful. And, the fact that a magistrate
is immune from liability for his or her negligent conduct, means
that there is also no basis for holding any other party vicariously
liable for such negligent conduct (para [23]).
BAIL
The appellant in Hlatywayo v S [2015] ZAECPEHC 33 (19 May
2015) was arrested and charged, together with two others, on
counts of robbery with aggravating circumstances read with the
provisions of section 51(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act
105 of 1997, and for possession of an unlicensed firearm and
ammunition in contravention of the provisions of the Firearms
Control Act 60 of 2000 (para [1]). During the formal bail hearing
the appellant submitted an affidavit as evidence to the court and
in order to comply with the provisions of section 60(11) of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1997 in discharging the onus to
satisfy the court that exceptional circumstances justified his
release on bail and that the interests of justice did not require
his detention in custody (para [3]; also see S v Dlamini; S v Dladla
& others; S v Joubert; S v Schietekat 1992 (2) SACR 51 (CC)).
While the appellant in this bail hearing relied solely on the
affidavit submitted, the content of which could obviously not be
tested by way of cross-examination, the state presented rebutting
evidence in the form of oral testimony by witnesses testifying
under oath (para [6]). In his judgment denying bail to the
appellant, the magistrate emphasised that the facts as elicited by
the appellant in his affidavit lacked detail which could be verified
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or confirmed and that the appellant’s ‘failure to testify in Court
deprived him of the opportunity to explain the inconsistency
between his evidence and that of the state witnesses’ (para [9]).
This was particularly detrimental to the appellant’s case as he
had a duty in terms of section 60(11) of the Criminal Procedure
Act 51 of 1977 to show, on a balance of probabilities, why he
should be released on bail (para [10]; also see Najoe & others v S
2012 (2) SACR 395 (ECP) and Mathebula v S 2010 (1) SACR 55
(SCA)).
Judge Tshiki for the High Court Eastern Cape Local Division,
Port Elizabeth, subsequently confirmed the decision of the magi-
strate’s court in finding that ‘on an analysis of the evidence as a
whole, the probative value of the statement produced by the
appellant and the burden of exceptional circumstances that
rested on the appellant in the court a quo that the appellant had
not succeeded in demonstrating that the court a quo was wrong’
(para [16]).
Also see Booi v S (CA&R04/2015) [2015] ZAECPEHC 38
(11 June 2015) and Faku v S (13/2015) [2015] ZAECPEHC 50
(8 September 2015).
CHAPTER 13 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 51 OF 1977
Chapter 13 (ss 77–79) of the Criminal ProcedureAct 51 of 1977
deals with the cognitive capabilities of an accused and specifi-
cally with the capacity of an accused to understand proceedings,
the presence of mental illness or other incapacities, and ulti-
mately also the effect thereof on the criminal responsibility of
such an accused. Section 77 deals with the capacity of an
accused to understand proceedings and provides that if it
appears to the court at any stage during criminal proceedings
that the accused is by reason of mental illness or mental defect
not capable of understanding the proceedings so as to make a
proper defence, that the court shall direct that the matter be
enquired into and be reported in accordance with the provisions
of section 79 of the Act. Section 79 of Chapter 13 prescribes the
process in terms of the composition of the panel of medical
experts to inquire into and report on the ability of an accused to
understand the proceedings in terms of section 77 of the Act, or
to inquire into and report on whether an accused suffers from a
mental illness or mental defect that affects his or her criminal
responsibility in terms of the alleged offence committed (s 78).
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Section 77(6)(a)(i) and the capacity of an accused to understand
proceedings
Specifically with regard to the question of whether an accused
is capable of understanding the proceedings so as to make a
proper defence, section 77(6)(a)(i) empowers a court to direct
that an accused, who is found to be incapable of understanding
the proceedings so as to make a proper defence, and who is
charged with murder or culpable homicide or rape or compelled
rape as contemplated in sections 3 or 4 of the Criminal Law
(Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act, 2007, or
a charge involving serious violence, or if the court considers it to
be otherwise necessary in the public interest, or finds that the
accused has committed the act in question, or any other offence
involving serious violence, that such an accused be detained in a
psychiatric hospital or a prison pending the decision of a judge in
chambers, in terms of section 47 of the Mental Health CareAct 17
of 2002. And, where a court finds that the accused has committed
an offence other than one of the offences contemplated in section
77(6)(a)(i) and described above, or finds that the accused has
not committed the offence, that such an accused be admitted to
and be detained in an institution stated in the order as if he or she
were an involuntary mental health user as contemplated in
section 37 of the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002. A court will
make a decision on the involvement of an accused in committing
the offence in terms of a ‘trial of facts’ which requires an
assessment, on a balance of probabilities, about the act only, not
engaging in any enquiry around the guilt of the accused.
The primary difference between sections 77(6)(a)(i) and (ii)
and sections 47 and 37 of the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002
is that the mental health status of an accused admitted to and
detained in an institution in terms of section 77(6)(a)(ii) of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 and section 37 of the Mental
Health Care Act 17 of 2002 must be reviewed six months after the
commencement of care, treatment and rehabilitation services,
and then every twelve months thereafter. The review report so
compiled must then be considered by a Review Board which
ultimately decides whether the accused can be discharged
(section 37(5)), and that the Registrar of the High Court be
notified in writing of a discharge made in terms of this section
(section 37(6)). An accused admitted and detained in terms of
section 77(6)(a)(i) and section 47 of the Mental Health Care Act
17 of 2002, however, can only be discharged on an application to
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a judge in chambers. (Also see S v Siko 2010 (2) SACR 406 ECB.)
This can furthermore be contrasted with section 78(6) of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 which vests a wide discretion
in a presiding officer, including to release an accused with or
without conditions, where that accused is found not to be
criminally responsible for his or her actions or omission due to a
mental illness or a mental defect which makes him or her
incapable of appreciating the wrongfulness of his or her actions
or omissions or to act in accordance therewith.
The constitutionality of sections 77(6)(a)(i) and (ii) of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 and how these two provisions
prescribe for accused persons incapable of understanding the
criminal proceedings to be admitted and detained in mental
health institutions came under scrutiny in De Vos NO & others v
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development & others 2015
(2) SACR 217 (CC), 2015 (9) BCLR 1026 (CC). The first and fourth
applicants in this case were the curators ad litem of two accused,
both suffering from an intellectual disability, and who had been
charged with murder and rape respectively (para [4]). The first
accused was fourteen years old in 2005 when he allegedly
stabbed a fourteen-year-old girl to death. The second accused
was 35 years old and was charged with the rape of an eleven-
year-old girl. Both accused were referred for observation in terms
of section 77(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 and
both were found not capable of appreciating the wrongfulness of
their actions and also not in a position to understand court
proceedings (paras [5] [6]).
In considering the constitutional validity of the two impugned
provisions, the Western Cape High Court in 2015 (1) SACR 18
(WCC) held that while it may in some circumstances be justified
to detain a person with a mental illness or an intellectual disability,
it may not always be so as not every person with a mental illness
or intellectual disability is a danger to himself or to society.
Special provision must also be made for children with a mental
illness or an intellectual disability, especially given the inade-
quacy of facilities for children in prisons and psychiatric hospitals
(para [9]). Section 77(6)(a) was therefore found to fall short in
not allowing a presiding officer to ‘(i) determine whether an
accused person continues to be a danger to society; (ii) evaluate
the individual needs or circumstances of that person; or (iii)
consider whether other options are more appropriate in the
individual circumstances of the accused’ (para [7]). Moreover, no
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justification could be found for the stringent requirements of
sections 77(6)(a)(i) and (ii), compared to the wide judicial discre-
tion provided for in terms of section 78(6) of the Act (para [8]).
The Constitutional Court agreed to an extent with Western
Cape Division’s declaration of invalidity. With regard to section
77(6)(a)(i), it was held that courts should be afforded a wider
discretion to deal appropriately with accused persons found to
be incapable of understanding the criminal proceedings so as to
make a proper defence. It was held that the tenets of the South
African Constitution ‘dictate that accused persons, who are not
considered dangerous, should not have their freedom curtailed in
a manner that is tantamount to inhuman and degrading punish-
ment in a way that impinges on their dignity and breaches their
right not to be deprived of their freedom without just cause’ (para
[46]). Imprisonment as a state patient can, therefore, only be
justified for the purpose of protecting the public, ie where that
state patient is likely to cause serious harm to him- or herself or
others (para [47]). Moreover, children suffering from a mental
illness, defect, or intellectual disability may, as required by
section 28(g) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,
1996, only be detained as a last resort (para [52]). Yet, with
regard to the distinction made between the options provided for
under section 77(6)(a)(i) and (ii) and section 78(6) of the Criminal
Procedure Act 51 of 1977, the Constitutional Court held that the
wider discretion in terms of section 78 is not irrational, as sections
77 and 78 of the Act serve different purposes; eg an accused
person dealt with in terms of section 78(6) may not necessarily
suffer from a mental illness at the time of the court proceedings
(para [39]).
With regard to section 77(6)(a)(ii), the Constitutional Court
emphasised that in terms of section 9(1)(c) of the Mental Health
Care Act 17 of 2002, an accused person can only be committed
involuntarily and in the absence of a court order if any delay in
providing care, treatment and rehabilitation services may result in
the death or irreversible harm to the health of that accused, or if
the accused is at risk of inflicting harm on himself or herself or
others, or of causing serious damage to or loss of property (para
[54]). Thus, the effect of section 77(6)(a)(ii) was that accused
persons could more readily be institutionalised under the Criminal
Procedure Act without the ordinary safeguards as prescribed in
section 9(1)(c) of the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002 (para
[54]). (In this regard it was also held that the ‘trial of the facts’
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does not provide an appropriate procedural safeguard (para
[57]). Mental illness and disability is furthermore complex; there
are varying degrees and types and institutionalisation and treat-
ment is not always required or appropriate (para [55]). The
Constitutional Court therefore agreed, as had been argued, that
the peremptory provisions of section 77(6)(a)(ii) of the Criminal
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 do breach the right to equality and
human dignity in that they perpetuate harmful stereotypes and
the assumption that all people with a mental illness or intellectual
disability are dangerous (para [56]).
It was subsequently declared that section 77(6)(a)(i) of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 is inconsistent with the Consti-
tution and invalid to the extent that it provides for the compulsory
imprisonment of an adult accused person and the compulsory
hospitalisation or imprisonment of children. This declaration of
invalidity was further suspended for a period of 24 months from the
date of the judgment in order to allow for Parliament to see to the
necessary legislative amendments. Section 77(6)(a)(ii) of the
Criminal ProcedureAct 51 of 1977 was declared to be inconsistent
with the Constitution and invalid and was amended to read as
follows
(ii) where the court finds that the accused has committed an offence
other than one contemplated in subparagraph (i) or that he or she
has not committed any offence —
(aa) be admitted to and detained in an institution stated in the
order as if he or she were an involuntary mental health care
user contemplated in section 37 of the Mental Health Care
Act 17 of 2002;
(bb)be released subject to such conditions as the court consid-
ers appropriate; or
(cc) be released unconditionally (para [69]).
The correct procedure in applying the provisions of section 77 of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
The accused in S v Dlali (3/2015) [2015] ZAECBHC 2 (27 Feb-
ruary 2015) was charged with assault and was admitted and
detained as a state patient pending the decision of a judge in
chambers, in terms of section 77(6)(a)(i) and section 47 of the
Mental Health CareAct 17 of 2002, after the prosecutor placed on
record that the accused ‘has (a) history of mental illness’ (paras
[1] [2]). No indication was given as to the objective of the referral,
nor was it clear whether the court issued the direction in terms of
sections 77(1) or 78(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
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(para [5]). Yet, a psychiatric report was compiled by an examin-
ing panel consisting of only two psychiatrists who found the
accused unable to follow court proceedings so as to make a
proper defence in terms of section 79(4)(c) of the Act, and also
unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of the act in question and
unable to act in accordance therewith in terms of section 79(4)(d)
of the Act (para [11]). The examining panel consequently recom-
mended that the accused be admitted as a state patient to
Komani Hospital in terms of section 42 of the Mental Health Care
Act 17 of 2002 (para [11]). The magistrate duly accepted this
psychiatric report and recommendation without making any
indication on the record as to whether the prosecution or the
defence accepted or contested the psychiatric report (para [7]).
There were a number of procedural misdirections in this case:
first, it is important that the basis for the ordering of a section 79
inquiry be established and included in the record (para [18]). The
record must further contain sufficient detail relating to the
accused person’s mental history, indicate the meaningful partici-
pation of all parties and/or their legal representatives in the court
proceedings, and show that a transparent, proper and relevant
reason exists for invoking the provisions of either section 77(1) or
section 78(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (para
[19]). A court must then, based on this information, make a
direction either in terms of sections 77(1) or 78(2), or both, as this
is a necessary jurisdictional basis for the enquiry in terms of
section 79(1) to be conducted and reported on (para [20]). The
composition of the examining panel also differs in terms of
section 77(6)(a)(i) as opposed to the panel in terms of subsection
(ii)(aa): ‘In the former case the court is obliged to receive a report
under section 79(1)(b) from a plenary panel (although not neces-
sarily including a psychologist except where the court so directs),
whereas in respect of the latter the report of a single psychiatrist
under section 79(1)(a) will suffice’ (para [22]). Upon receipt of the
psychiatric report, a court must then make a finding as to whether
the accused is capable of understanding the proceedings so as
to make a proper defence and/or whether the accused can be
held criminally responsible for his or her actions and/or omis-
sions. This, it was held, is ‘an obvious prerequisite’ before such
an accused can be detained, whether as a state patient or as an
involuntary mental health care user (para [25]).
In reviewing this case Judge Hartle of the High Court Eastern
Cape Division, Bhisho, stated that he ‘cannot imagine a more
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vulnerable category of accused persons than those subject to the
provisions of Chapter 13’ of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of
1977 (para [32])
Such an accused person is present in court yet possibly mentally
absent, particularly if he cannot instruct his legal representative or
meaningfully participate in the court proceedings. He is displaced to a
foreign environment in a psychiatric hospital where he is subjected to
an enquiry of a different kind (before a ‘trial’ on the facts is undertaken
to determine if he probably perpetrated the crime), the relevance of
which may have no significance to him (yet infringe upon his fair trial
rights), by an array of professionals he has no affinity with. This is an
experience which in itself must be anxiety provoking. Thereupon the
court may issue an order appointing him as a state patient which has
potentially serious consequences but which might not be warranted in
all the circumstances (especially if the charge is in respect of a petty
offence) or be more damning than if he were just convicted and
sentenced in the ordinary course (para [33]).
The correct procedure in applying the provisions of section 77
of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 was set out in S v Matu
2012 (1) SACR 68 (ECD) (para [29] of the Matu case and referred
to in para [28] of the case under discussion). Judge Hartle further
emphasised the absolute need for a legal practitioner to be
vigilant in ensuring that an accused’s fair trial rights are
respected throughout the process and ‘properly weighed against
the need to protect the community from mentally ill members of
society who brush with the law’ (para [36]). This matter was
subsequently referred back to the magistrate’s court to be dealt
with appropriately in terms of Chapter 13 of the Criminal Proce-
dure Act 51 of 1977 (para [38.2]).
Number of psychiatrists to be appointed
The accused in S v Pedro 2015 (1) SACR 42 (WCC) was
charged with culpable homicide and referred for assessment in
terms of section 79(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of
1977. In terms of a report compiled by two state psychiatrists, the
accused was found not to have the capacity when he committed
the alleged offence, of appreciating the wrongfulness of his
actions and acting accordance therewith (para [5]). The accused
was subsequently found not guilty in terms of section 78(6)(a) of
the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 and was ordered, in terms
of section 77(6)(a)(ii) of the Act, to be admitted and detained at
Valkenberg Hospital as an involuntary mental health user as
contemplated in section 37 of the Mental Health Care Act 17 of
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2002 (para [5]). (In doing so, the magistrate departed from the
recommendation in the psychiatric report for the accused to be
detained as a state patient in terms of section 77(6)(a)(i) of the
Act (para [5]).)
The trial magistrate erred in a number of respects: the charge
was never put to the accused and the accused was never asked
to plead. A finding of not guilty on the charge of culpable
homicide was, therefore, not proper. Furthermore, the order for
the accused’s admission to and detention at a mental health care
institution should have been made in terms of section 77(6)(a)(i)
and not section 77(6)(a)(ii) (paras [6] [7] [80] and [101]-[104]).
Important for the discussion here, is the composition of the
psychiatric panel.
Section 79(1)(b) requires the following persons to serve on the
assessment panel for an accused charged with murder, culpable
homicide, rape, compelled rape, other charges involving serious
violence, or if the court considers it necessary or otherwise in the
public interest: the medical superintendent of a psychiatric
hospital or another psychiatrist appointed by the medical super-
intendent (s 79(1)(b)(i)), a psychiatrist appointed by the court
and who is not in the full-time service of the state unless the court
directs otherwise upon application of a prosecutor (s 79(1)(b)(ii)),
a psychiatrist appointed for the accused by the court
(s 79(1)(b)(iii)), and a clinical psychologist where the court so
directs (s 79(1)(b)(iv)). Section 79(1)(a) applies to accused
charged with offences not referred to in section 79(1)(b), and as
set out above, and requires that the mental health assessment
be conducted by the medical superintendent of a psychiatric
hospital designated by the court, or by a psychiatrist appointed
by the medical superintendent at the request of the court. Section
79(1)(a) can therefore be said to apply to less serious cases.
With regard to section 79(1)(b)(ii), section 79(13) states that the
National Director of Public Prosecutions must, in consultation with
the Minister, issue directives regarding the cases and circum-
stances in which a prosecutor must apply to the court for the
appointment of a psychiatrist as provided for in section
79(1)(b)(ii). In this regard, therefore, some uncertainty existed: it
was unclear whether the panel referred to in section 79(1)(b)(ii)
must include a second psychiatrist, unless the court, on applica-
tion by the prosecutor, directs otherwise, or if the court must
appoint such a psychiatrist only if the prosecutor applies to the
court for such an appointment to be made. A further question was
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whether that psychiatrist must be from private practice or
employed by the state, or as a third alternative to the above, if the
court must always appoint a second psychiatrist to the panel,
unless the prosecutor applies for a direction that this psychiatrist
need not be a private psychiatrist but that the court may appoint a
state psychiatrist (para [28]).
In considering the explanatory memorandum accompanying
the legislative amendments that gave rise to section 79(13), ie
the Judicial Matters Amendment Act 66 of 2008, as well as the
directives issued by the National Director of Public Prosecutions
in this regard, Judge Rogers (Judge Binns-Ward concurring) for
the High Court Western Cape Division, Cape Town, held that the
‘most natural meaning’ of the words used in section 79(1)(b)(ii) is
that the mental health assessment panel must include a second
psychiatrist, unless the court, on application by the prosecutor,
directs otherwise (para [50]; also see S v Lubisi & others 2003 (2)
SACR 589 (T)). The appointment of this second psychiatrist to the
panel is therefore not based on the condition that the prosecutor
must first apply for the appointment of such a psychiatrist, as
section 79(13) seems to suggest. Further, with regard to whether
such a second psychiatrist must be from private practice or may
also be employed by the state, it was held that there are good
policy reasons for the second psychiatrist to be from private
practice and not also be a state psychiatrist like the other
appointees to the panel (para [51]). It was suggested that the
legislative requirement for a private psychiatrist was premised on
the notion that the presence of such a psychiatrist on the panel
would provide greater protection for the rights of the accused, as
there was
an institutional connection between the prosecution and the state
psychiatrists, all being public servants. Where [for example] two state
psychiatrists are on the panel they will often be employed at the
same psychiatric hospital. Considerations of collegiality might tend,
subconsciously, towards consensus; or differences in seniority might
result in one psychiatrist displaying some deference to the other. There
is even danger that, due to the greater pressure on state psychiatric
resources, the primary assessment in respect of a particular accused
will be left to one of the state psychiatrists, with the other providing a
more supporting role (para [52]).
Judge Rogers further stated that section 79(13)(a) of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 must be construed so as to
empower the National Director of Public Prosecutions to issue
directives regarding the circumstances under which prosecutors
333CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 15 PAGE: 18 SESS: 16 OUTPUT: Tue Jun 6 13:03:57 2017
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey15/ch10
may apply to a court to dispense with the appointment of a
private psychiatrist (para [60]). Section 79(13)(a) was therefore
held to deal with those circumstances in which a private psychia-
trist is not to be appointed (para [60]).
The panel responsible for the mental assessment of the
accused in this case consisted of only two psychiatrists. In terms
of the explanation above, section 79(1)(b)(ii) had not been
properly complied with, nor had section 79(1)(b)(iii) as it was
evident that the court did not appoint the second psychiatrist for
the accused (paras [73]-[75]). Moreover, with regard to section
79(1)(b)(i) which requires that the medical superintendent or a
psychiatrist appointed by the medical superintendent serve on
the panel, it was also held that this requirement should be
interpreted to mean the person holding the most senior psychiatric
position at the mental health institution (para [77]). In the present
case, it was not clear whether the first psychiatrist was indeed the
relevant ‘medical superintendent’ or the valid designee of the
‘medical superintendent’ (para [78]).
A final peculiarity in this case was that the accused was
discharged from detention at the Valkenberg Hospital in terms of
section 38 of the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002 within less
than two months after the assessment panel had found him to
lack the capacity to understand criminal proceedings and to also
lack criminal responsibility as to the offence that he allegedly
committed. The court held that this is surprising as a discharge in
terms of section 38 of the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002 can
only be effected by the head of the mental health institution and
after it is decided that the accused/mental health care user is
capable of making informed decisions, ie informed decisions
about his own care (para [113]). It was consequently recom-
mended that a referral for detention in terms of section 77(6)(a)(ii)
of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 should also include that
periodic review reports as to the accused’s mental health status
be sent to the relevant Director of Public Prosecutions, as it is
usually appropriate for that accused, if he or she recovers, to be
prosecuted so that an appropriate verdict and order can be
made in terms of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act 51
of 1977 (para [114]).
Also see S v Ralane (A222/14) [2015] ZAECBHC 18 (21 June
2015); S v Maphuko (A180/15) [2015] ZAECBHC 17 (30 June
2015); S v Diniso (A3970/14, 21/15) [2015] ZAECBHC 27
(11 September 2015); Director of Public Prosecutions v Roro
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(464/2015) [2015] ZAECGHC 98 (14 September 2015) and S v
Maluka 2015 (2) SACR 273 (GP).
Joining of accused and separation of trials
Sections 155 to 157 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
deal in general with those instances where it is necessary and in
the interest of justice to either join together more than one
accused in the same trial, or to separate the trials of accused who
had been jointly charged. While section 157 of the Act sets out
the general principles, sections 155 and 156 make provision for
special instances, respectively for accused who have been
implicated in the same offence to be tried together, and for
persons who had committed separate offences but at the same
time and place, to be joined together in the same trial.
Joining together the trials of persons having committed separate offences at
the same time and place
Section 156 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 allows for
persons having committed separate offences at the same place
and at the same time or at about the same time, to be charged
and tried together if the prosecutor informs the court that the
evidence admissible against one of these persons will, in his
opinion, also be admissible as evidence at the trial of any other
such person or persons so tried.
In Dereki & another v S [2015] ZAECGHC 59 (13 February
2015), the two accused were charged with contravening section
5(b) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992, and were
tried jointly in terms of this provision of the Criminal ProcedureAct
51 of 1977. Both the accused were convicted and sentenced
(para [1]). Yet, it was apparent from the record that the prosecutor,
when applying for the accused to be tried together, expressly
stated that the evidence against each accused would be ‘sepa-
rate’ (para [5]). And, although the legal representative of the
accused indicated that this could be a misjoinder if the accused
were to be tried together, and that the accused would be
prejudiced, this objection was withdrawn after the magistrate
gave assurance that he would differentiate between the two
charges when giving judgment (para [5]). This assurance and the
withdrawal of the objection raised, according to Judge Roberson
of the High Court Eastern Cape Division, Grahamstown, did not
legitimate the incorrect application of section 156 of the Criminal
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (para [5]).
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Section 156 of the Act should not have been invoked in this
case as the evidence implicating the two accused was not only
completely separate, but the two offences allegedly committed
were more than two months apart and for this reason ‘not at the
same time or about the same time’ (para [5]). Given that only the
place where the alleged offences had been committed was the
same, it was found to be prejudicial to the accused in the
absence of any other similarities and evidence linking the two
cases together (para [6]). Despite the other irregularities identi-
fied and considered in the automatic review, Judge Roberson
indicated that the misjoinder alone was a sufficient ground for the
setting aside of the proceedings (para [14]).
Separation of trials where the state alleges a common purpose to defraud
with considerable overlap in evidence
In Maringa & another v S 2015 (2) SACR 629 (SCA) (23 March
2015), a total of seven accused were arraigned on a total of 339
charges that included fraud, forgery, uttering and corruption
(para [1]). The first appellant in this matter was charged with all of
the counts, barring those counts relating to the corruption
charges, and the second appellant was charged with 34 counts
of fraud. Before any of the accused pleaded, the two appellants
objected to being charged together with the other five co-accused,
on the ground that they did not face all the same charges together
(para [1]). The state, however, argued that the seven accused acted
in pursuance of a common purpose, and that all the accused,
including the two appellants, all played an intricate and necessary
part in the criminal scheme (paras [8]-[11]).
Judge Schoeman, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court
of Appeal, described the purpose of sections 155 and 156 of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 in pursuance of avoiding a
multiplicity of trials where there are a number of accused
(para [14]). It was also held that it is ultimately the discretion of a
trial court to decide whether to allow a trial to proceed, or to order
a separation of trials (para [15]). After considering relevant case
law, it was concluded that the alleged offences in this particular
case were all ‘committed within a period of two months and were
therefore committed at about the same time and place and were
furthermore in furtherance of a common purpose’ (para [19]; also
see S v Ntuli & others 1978 (2) SA 69 (A) para [73]; R v Heyne
1956 (3) 604 (A); S v Ramgobin & others 1986 (1) SA 68 (N);
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S v Naidoo 2009 (2) SACR 674 (GSJ)). Moreover, the only
prejudice that may result from the appellants being tried together
with the other co-accused, was that the appellants would have to
sit through a trial while evidence was presented that did not relate
directly to the charges that they faced (para [20]). Conversely, if a
separation of trials were ordered, the state would suffer prejudice
as there would then be a total of three separate trials (as the two
appellants could then not be tried together), and essentially the
same witnesses would have to testify in each case about the
same facts, and there would also be considerable overlap in the
other evidence presented (para [20]). It was, therefore, con-
cluded that the magistrate had correctly exercised a discretion
and there was no indication that his discretion had not been
exercised judicially (para [21]).
PLEAS
The plea of an accused person, including the possibility of plea
and sentence agreements, are dealt with in Chapter 15 of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
A plea of guilty to a charge of driving a motor vehicle while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor
In S v Funani (4/2015) [2015] ZAECBHC 8 (17 April 2015), it
was affirmed that where an accused pleads guilty in terms of
section 112 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, to a charge
of having contravened section 65(1)(a) of the National Road
Traffic Act 93 of 1996, that the presiding officer shall ensure, in
terms of section 112(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of
1977, that the accused indeed admits to all the allegations in the
charge and that the accused is guilty of the offence (paras
[4]-[6]; also see S v Naidoo 1989 (2) SA 114 (A)).
Such a guilty plea must, for example, include an admission that
the driving ability of the accused was impaired as a result of the
consumption of intoxicating liquor. This, it was held, ‘is necessary
on account of the relevant substantive law requirement that ‘‘the
skill and judgment normally required of a driver in the manipula-
tion of a vehicle (must be) diminished or impaired as a result of
the consumption of intoxicating liquor’’ ’ (para [7]; also see S v
Mzimba 2012 (2) SACR 233 (KZP)). The lack of this necessary
admission by an accused that he or she was incapable of
exercising proper control of the motor vehicle, or that his or her
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ability to drive had been impaired due to the consumption of
liquor, constitutes a fundamental irregularity (para [12]).
Also see S v Mxhaka (191/2014) [2015] ZAFSHC 31 (9 February
2015) and S v Mhlophe (245/2015) [2015] ZAFSHC 232
(10 December 2015). In the Mhlophe case, it was reaffirmed that
an accused cannot be convicted on both the main and alternative
charges stemming from the same set of facts in contravention of
the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
Double jeopardy/Autrefois convict
The appellant in Lelaka v S (272/15) [2015] ZASCA 169
(26 November 2015) was charged with one count of assault with
the intent to do grievous bodily harm and, upon pleading guilty in
terms of section 112(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977,
was remanded in custody for sentencing (para [1]). However,
before sentencing the magistrate was informed that the com-
plainant in the matter had since died and that the state was
considering bringing a murder charge against the appellant
(para [2]).
Judge Mathopo writing for the majority of the Supreme Court of
Appeal affirmed that the plea of autrefois convict is not available
in those cases where it was impossible at the previous trial to
prefer the more serious charge(s) as it later presented (para [7]).
Thus, in the present case, a conviction for assault was no bar to a
prosecution for murder or culpable homicide where the victim
had since died (para [7]). In this matter, the appellant pleaded
guilty and was convicted on 14 February 2013 and the deceased
died on 15 February 2013 from injuries relating to the assault.
When the appellant was convicted the deceased was still alive
and a case of murder or culpable homicide therefore only
became viable thereafter (para [8]).
PREVENTION OF ORGANISED CRIME ACT 121 OF 1998
The Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (POCA),
together with statutes such as the Financial Intelligence Centre
Act 38 of 2001 (FICA) and the Prevention and Combating of
Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004, were adopted to give effect to
South Africa’s international obligations to prevent and punish
serious economic and organised crime. The POCA provides for
three clusters of offence that can collectively be viewed as core
organised crimes, namely: racketeering offences; money laun-
dering offences; and offences related to criminal gang activities.
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Apart from substantive criminal law, the POCA also provides for
comprehensive procedural mechanisms aimed at criminal and
civil forfeiture of the proceeds of crime. These procedural frame-
works apply to all proceeds of crime generally and are not limited
to the proceeds of the three groups of offence provided for in the
POCA.
Payment of living expenses from assets restrained in terms of a provisional
order granted under section 26 of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act
121 of 1998
In Van Staden & another v Knoetze NO & another 2015 (1)
SACR 97 (WCC), the High Court Western Cape Division, Cape
Town, had to consider when a person or persons had sufficient
interests in assets that are subject to a restraint order made in
terms of section 26 of the POCA.
Section 26 of the POCA provides for a restraint order to be
issued by way of an ex parte application by the National Director
to a competent High Court, and in respect of such realisable
property as specified in the restraint order, and held by the
person against whom the restraint order is made, or realisable
property held by such a person irrespective of whether it is
specified in the restraint order or not, or in respect of property
which, if it is transferred to such a person after the restraint order
has been put in place, would constitute realisable property
(s 26(1)-(2)(a)–(c)). Such a restraint order may further provide for
the reasonable living expenses of a person against whom it has
been made, as well as for that person’s family or household, and
for the reasonable legal expenses of such a person in connection
with any proceedings instituted against him or her in terms of
Chapter Five of the POCA or any other criminal proceeding to
which such proceedings may relate. This, however, will only be
allowed where the court is satisfied that the person whose
expenses must be provided for has disclosed under oath all his
or her interests in the property subject to such a restraint order
and that the person is furthermore unable to meet the expenses
concerned out of his or her unrestrained property (s 26(6)(a)–
(b)).
The applicants in the Van Staden case were the wife and 21-
year-old son of Johannes Erasmus van Staden, whose assets
were placed under restraint, together with those of various other
defendants, pending a criminal trial for alleged fraud committed
against the SouthAfrican Revenue Service (SARS) (paras [5] [6]).
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The applicants were also trustees of the Van Staden family trust,
which was also subject to the restraint order (para [7]). The
applicants sought payment of living and other expenses from the
assets that formed part of the trust and that were subject to the
restraint order, and argued that they had the necessary locus
standi to bring such an application as they had a direct link to the
assets under restraint (para [13]). The National Director of Public
Prosecutions, on the other hand, in relying on Naidoo & others v
National Director of Public Prosecutions & another 2012 (1) SACR
358 (CC), submitted that the applicants did not have a sufficient
interest in the property to seek the relief they had (para [12]).
The correct interpretation of section 26(6) of the POCA was
considered at length in the Naidoo case where it was found, inter
alia, that too wide an interpretation of section 26(6) of the Act
would run counter to the purpose of the scheme, and that the
provision for reasonable living and legal expenses ought, for this
reason, to be ‘narrowly crafted’ in light of the overall legislative
purpose of discouraging defendants who faced criminal prose-
cution from hiding their assets (para [19]; also see National
Director of Public Prosecutions v Elran 2013 (1) SACR 429 (CC)).
With regard specifically to the property relating to this applica-
tion, the court emphasised that all the trustees and beneficiaries
of the trust to which the application referred and which was
subject to the restraint order, were not before the court and the
two applicants rather brought their application in their individual
capacities. The court held that this was insufficient to link the
applicants to the property and that it was also not satisfactory that
only two beneficiaries brought such an application where there
were many more beneficiaries listed in the trust deed (para [25]).
The applicants also failed in relying on section 26(1) of the POCA
in support of their application as this section, it was held, refers to
property as a means of earning money so as to provide for
reasonable living expenses, and not to cash, which was what the
applicants’ application for relief was aimed at (paras [32] [33]).
The same applied to the applicants’ reliance on section 28(2)(a)
and 28(3)(a) of the POCA (paras [35]-[37]).
It was consequently concluded that section 26(6) of the POCA
is only available ‘for an order to be made for release of cash for
living and legal expenses against restrained property in these
circumstances’, and furthermore only once the following condi-
tions had been met: there must be full disclosure of the interests
of that person in the restrained property; and that person must not
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be able to otherwise meet the expenses concerned out of his or
her unrestrained property (para [39]).
Also see Schoeman & others v National Director of Public
Prosecutions & another 2015 (1) SACR 451 (WCC) with regard to
the rescission of restraint orders in terms of section 26(3) of the
POCA.
The proportionality requirement for the forfeiture to the state of the
instrumentalities of offences
In National Director of Public Prosecutions v Salie 2015 (1)
SACR 121 (WCC), the applicant applied, in terms of sections
48(1), 50(1)(a) and (b) and 53(1)(a) of the POCA for an order
declaring two immovable properties and a motor vehicle owned
by the respondents forfeit to the state. (At the time of the
judgment the money held in bank accounts of the respondents
and which the applicant also wanted to be forfeited to the state
had been depleted.) The applicant contended that the property
was the proceeds of contravening sections 2 (keeping a brothel)
and 20(1)(a) (knowingly living wholly or in part on the earnings of
prostitution), in terms of the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957 (para
[6]). A preservation of property order had previously been duly
served on the respondents and the current application for a
forfeiture order was made in terms of the applicable provisions of
the POCA which require a court to make the requisite forfeiture
order if it finds, on a balance of probabilities, that the property
concerned is an instrumentality of an offence referred to in
Schedule 1 of the POCA, or the proceeds of other unlawful
activities (para [5]).
In considering all the evidence, Judge Breitenbach of the
Western Cape High Court, Cape Town, agreed that the property
indeed constituted the proceeds of offences as submitted by the
applicant (paras [99]-[107]). However, the respondents argued
that even if the property was the proceeds of the offences,
none of it should be forfeited to the state as the forfeiture would
be disproportionate and would consequently infringe on the
respondents’ right not to be arbitrarily deprived of property in
terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution (para [109]).
First, with regard to the question whether proportionality
applies to the forfeiture to the state of the proceeds of unlawful
activity, it was concluded that proportionality is indeed a require-
ment for the forfeiture to the state and the proceeds of unlawful
activity under the POCA (para [135]). It was held that the
341CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 15 PAGE: 26 SESS: 16 OUTPUT: Tue Jun 6 13:03:57 2017
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey15/ch10
forfeiture of instrumentalities of crime and the proceeds of
unlawful activities must be at the very least rationally related to its
purposes (para [112]). In the case of National Director of Public
Prosecutions v RO Cook Properties (Pty) Ltd; National Director of
Public Prosecutions v 37 Gillespie Street Durban (Pty) Ltd;
National Director of Public Prosecutions v Seevnarayan 2004 (2)
SACR 208 (SCA), it was held that ‘the relationship between the
purpose of the forfeiture and the property to be forfeited must be
close, that the purpose of the forfeiture must be compelling and
that a proportionality analysis in which the nature and value of the
property subject to forfeiture is assessed in relation to the crime
involved and the role it played in its commission’ (paras [30] [31])
of the Cook Properties case; also see First National Bank of SA
Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service;
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance
2002 (4) SA 768 (CC)). This proportionality analysis was
described in Prophet v National Director of Public Prosecutions
2006 (2) SACR 525 (CC) as ‘weighing the severity of the
interference with individual rights to property against the extent to
which the property was used for the purpose of the commission
of the offence, bearing in mind the nature of the offence’ (para
[58] of the Prophet case).
Furthermore, equivalences exist between the confiscation
orders envisaged in Chapter 5 of the POCA and the forfeiture
orders as per its Chapter 6 (paras [120]-[128]). For example,
both section 18(1) of Chapter 5 and section 50(1)(b) of Chapter 6
are directed at preventing people from ‘benefiting from the fruits
of crime; and, once the jurisdictional requirements for a confisca-
tion order or a forfeiture order relating to the proceeds of unlawful
activities are met, both of them confer on the court a discretion as
to whether or not to make any such order at all and, if so, the
extent of the benefit to be confiscated or the property to be
forfeited to the state’ (para [128]). And, because of these equiva-
lences, the three considerations or elements of the proportionality
enquiry in terms of section 18(1) of the POCA as raised in S v
Shaik 2008 (2) SACR 165 (CC) also apply to section 50(1) of the
POCA (para [134]). These three elements are: all the circum-
stances of the criminal activity concerned (para [130]); the extent
to which the property is derived directly from the criminal
activities (para [131]); and the nature of the crimes that fall within
the express contemplation of the Act (para [132]). A further
consideration not considered in Shaik but also relevant to the
342 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2015)
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 15 PAGE: 27 SESS: 16 OUTPUT: Tue Jun 6 13:03:57 2017
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey15/ch10
proportionality analysis for forfeiture to the state, is the use to
which the property is being put (para [137]).
In applying all of these considerations to the case at hand, and
also taking into account evidence on the circumstances of the
criminal activity and the nature and inherent seriousness of the
offences, the court found that although contraventions of sections
2 and 20(1)(a) of the Sexual Offences Act must be regarded as
serious, ‘the commission of those offences in the present matter
was not accompanied by any aggravating factors’ and a range of
notable mitigating factors were also present (para [150]). Both
properties the brothels operated from were, for example, ‘tidy
and well-run places with no violent abuse of the prostitutes, no
pimps, no compulsion, no trafficking in persons for sexual
purposes, no child prostitution, no drugs on the premises and no
connection with other crimes, and . . . care was taken to protect
the women against sexually transmitted diseases’ (para [148]).
Yet, the contraventions in this case constituted an organised
crime offence, namely racketeering in terms of section 2(1)(e) of
the POCA (paras [152]-[160]), and a relatively close connection
existed between the property and the commission of the offences
(para [161]). The respondents also had a considerable interest in
the property and the value of their total proven benefit from the
unlawful activity was also considerable (paras [162]-[165]). The
court therefore concluded that the forfeiture to the state of the
property involved would not be disproportionate when viewed in
monetary terms (paras [165]-[167]).
The case at hand was therefore not ‘an exceptional one in
which an entire forfeiture, as opposed to a partial forfeiture or no
forfeiture, will constitute an arbitrary deprivation of property in
contravention of s 25(1) of the Constitution’ (para [168]).
REMAND DETAINEES
Section 49G of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998
requires that the head of a remand detention facility or correc-
tional centre refer to the court concerned all remand detainees
‘whose period of detention exceeds two years from the detainee’s
initial date of admission to the facility or centre, in order to
determine the further detention of such (detainee) or (his or her)
release under conditions appropriate to the case (S v Matshoba
& others 2015 (1) SACR 448 (ECP) para [3]). The procedure to be
followed for such referrals is set out in the Justice, Crime
Prevention and Security (JCPS) Protocol (see s 49G(5) of the
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Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998). Furthermore, article 4.3 of
the JCPS requires that the head of a facility or correctional centre
forward to the clerk of the court ‘the request for the court to
consider the further detention of awaiting trial prisoners once the
period of detention exceeds 21 months from the initial date of
admission’ (S v Matshoba & others 2015 (1) SACR 448 (ECP)
para [4]).
The purpose of section 49G was considered in Ditlhakanyane
& others v S 2015 (1) SACR 437 (GJ) where it was held that the
provision aims to ‘strike a balance between the interests of the
accused’s right to liberty and the interests of justice because,
pending the finalisation of an accused’s trial, he or she is
presumed to be innocent until proven guilty’ (para [34]).
With regard to the process of the section 49G enquiry, the
JCPS provides that, in considering the further detention of a
remand detainee, the normal principles and requirements relating
to bail, as set out in the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, apply
(a 6(2) of the Protocol; S v Matshoba & others 2015 (1) SACR 448
(ECP) para [5]). However, Justice Hartle of the Eastern Cape High
Court, Port Elizabeth, held in S v Matshoba & others 2015 (1) SACR
448 (ECP) that the objective of section 49G of the Correctional
Services Act 111 of 1998 is not to ‘hold a bail hearing proper, such
as envisaged in s 60 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977’
(para [6]). Quoting from an unreported judgment he delivered
on 6 August 2013 (S v Sheyi unreported, case no CC 4/2911
(ECB), 6 August 2013) he held that
. . . all that is required is to take note that the detained person has
passed a certain threshold, one which puts him into a category of
persons the Department of Correctional Services should be particu-
larly mindful of. This no doubt acts as a bulwark (and as an oversight
function) against the rights of an incarcerated person being infringed
without lawful cause or him being subjected to arbitrary detention. It
ensures that upon reflection there remains good reason for his
continued incarceration. Whilst I have no doubt that considerations
such as an inordinate delay in prosecution, the loss of absence of vital
evidence or witnesses (or other convincing grounds such as will
evolve in practice which threaten to condemn an incarcerated
detainee to an open ended and unreasonably protracted incarcera-
tion) may provide a sound reason for a court to release an accused
who has hitherto been pending a trial, I am not persuaded that the
amendment requires the court to revisit the issue as if it were a bail
hearing (S v Matshoba & others 2015 (1) SACR 448 (ECP) para [6]).
In Ditlhakanyane & others v S 2015 (1) SACR 437 (GJ), the
applicants brought an application to be released in terms of
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section 49G(3) of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998. All of
the applicants in this matter had been arrested in the period
between June 2011 and March 2012 on charges in terms of the
POCA and had launched bail applications which were ultimately
unsuccessful (paras [1]-[3]). In this case, Justice Mokgoatlheng
of the South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg, held that given
the seriousness of the charges against the applicants, and the
fact that the charges fall within the purview of Schedule 5 of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, the onus was on the appli-
cants to show that their release would not prejudice the interests
of justice (para [6]). And, because the continued detention of the
applicants limits and curtails their constitutional right to liberty,
there is also a corresponding onus on the respondent to show
that the release of the applicants would not be in the interests of
justice (para [6]).
In considering the particular circumstances of each of the
applicants’ cases, as well as the strength of the respondent’s
case, Justice Mokgoatlheng found that it would not be in the
interests of justice to order the release of the applicants (para [51]).
Some of the considerations he took into account in reaching his
decision included the following
(a) The probable period of time the trial is still to endure until
finalisation;
(b) the reasons for any delay in the prosecution and finalisation of the
trial;
(c) the nature and the gravity of the charges the applicants are
facing;
(d) the strength of the case against the applicants and the probability
that the applicants as a consequence thereof may attempt to flee
or evade their trial; and
(e) the severity of the sentence likely to be imposed, should the
applicants be convicted (para [49]).
VALIDITY OF PROCEEDINGS WHERE THE ATTORNEY REPRESENTING A
CLIENT HAS NO RIGHT OF APPEARANCE
Where an attorney representing a client has no right of appear-
ance, the proceedings in terms of which he or she appeared on
behalf of the client are a nullity based on the irregularity thereof,
and it is then up to the state to decide whether to proceed against
the accused de novo (see, for example, S v Nghondzweni 2013
(1) SACR 272 (FB) 273 paras [5] [6]). This was confirmed in the
case of S v Swapi & others (14/14, RCZ 300/13, 6/2014) [2015]
ZAECBHC 23 (1 September 2015). However, a further question
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considered in the Swapi matter was whether the proceedings
ought to be set aside in their entirety where the case entails more
than one accused joined in the same proceedings, and only one
of the accused is represented by an attorney without the requisite
right of appearance.
Contrary to the decision in S v Gwantshu & another 1995 (2)
SACR 384 (E), where it was held that the mere fact of one
attorney’s lack of authority was sufficient to vitiate the proceedings
as a whole, and irrespective of the wishes of the affected parties
(386a–c of Gwantshu and para [19] of the case under discussion),
Judge Stretch of the Eastern Cape High Court, Bhisho, held that
‘the main test in deciding whether the entire trial should start afresh
(in other words without separating the affected accused from the
others) is [rather] whether any of the accused will suffer prejudice,
or are likely to suffer prejudice if this course of conduct is to be
preferred’ (para [23]). In particular, it was held that such trials
should not be set aside entirely where the record does not call for
such a course of conduct to be followed, or where the affected
parties, including the accused, the presiding officer and the
prosecutor do not deem such an approach necessary, convenient,
or in the interests of justice, where it appears to be in the interests
of justice to commence de novo against the affected accused only,
or where a separation of trials together with appropriate measures
are unlikely to prejudice the accused or the administration of
justice (para [22]). Matters like this, therefore, ought to be dealt
with on a case-by-case basis and each on its own merits (para
[23]).
WARRANT FOR ARREST IN TERMS OF SECTION 5 OF THE EXTRADITION
ACT 67 OF 1962
In Saliu v S (2014/A262) [2015] ZAGPJHC 175 (25 August
2015), the interaction between section 5 of the Extradition Act 67
of 1962 and sections 30(1)K and 43 of the Criminal ProcedureAct
51 of 1977 came under scrutiny. In this case, the appellant, a
Nigerian citizen, was wanted in the United States of America on
several fraud-related charges (para [1]). An order subsequent to
an enquiry committing the appellant to prison pending the
decision by the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Develop-
ment with regard to his surrender to the United States of America,
was consequently issued in terms of section 10(1) of the Extradi-
tion Act 67 of 1962 (para [2]). However, the appellant argued that
his arrest had been unlawful because the warrant on which his
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arrest relied, and which was issued in terms of section 5 of the
Extradition Act 67 of 1962, had been unlawfully procured, and as
such, the extradition enquiry was also tainted as it ought never to
have been conducted (para [3]).
This arrest warrant was obtained just moments after the
appellant had been released from the prison cells at the Kempton
Park Magistrate’s Court, after that court had set aside an earlier
arrest (without a warrant) on the basis that it was unlawful (paras
[4] [9]). While all the necessary elements for a warrant under
section 5 of the Extradition Act 67 of 1962 had been complied
with, it was argued that the magistrate who issued the warrant
had been misled by a material non-disclosure, in that he was not
informed of the setting aside of the previous arrest and the
circumstances relating thereto (para [9]; also see McCarthy v
Additional Magistrate, Johannesburg & others [2000] All SA 561
(A)).
However, Judges Sutherland and Francis of the South Gauteng
High Court, Johannesburg, did not agree with this submission.
They held that even if the history of the case had been disclosed
there would have been no objective reason why the magistrate
would have had any objection to issuing the subsequent arrest
warrant (para [13]). The judges also reaffirmed that the provisions
of section 43(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 only
apply to arrest warrants for persons who have allegedly committed
crimes within the jurisdiction of South Africa (para [16]). Section
40(1)K of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 covers those
instances where an arrest is to be effected of persons who
allegedly committed crimes outside the ordinary jurisdiction of
South African courts and in respect of which no trial in a South
African court would be competent (para [17]).
WRITTEN PERMISSION TO PROSECUTE NECESSARY BEFORE
COMMENCING WITH THE PROSECUTION OF CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS
The applicant in Masinga v National Director of Public Prosecu-
tions & another (AR 517/2013) [2015] ZAKZPHC 24 (7 May 2015)
was found guilty of attempted murder and sentenced to ten
years’ imprisonment (para [1]). The applicant, however, com-
plained that the prosecution was irregular in that it was instituted
and proceeded with without the written authorisation or instruc-
tion of the DPP (para [2]). Such authorisation was required, it was
argued, in terms of the prosecution policy issued under section
21(1)(b) of the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, as
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the applicant was a magistrate at the time of the criminal
proceeding against him (para [2]; also see section 179(5) of the
Constitution). The policy directive upon which the applicant relied
stated the following
In addition to instances where statutory provisions require prior
authorisation from the National Director or DPP for the institution of a
prosecution, there are certain categories of persons in respect of
whom prosecutors may not institute and proceed with prosecutions
without the written authorisation or instruction of the DPP or a person
authorised thereto in writing by the National Director or DPP (either in
general terms or in any particular case or category of cases) (para
[3]).
Magistrates are included in the categories of persons in
respect of whom written authorisation or instruction is required
(para [4]).
It was not disputed that the requisite written authorisation of the
DPP was not obtained, but the prosecutor who had handled the
prosecution claimed that oral authorisation of the then acting DPP
was indeed obtained to proceed with the prosecution against the
applicant (para [6]).
Judge Ploos van Amstel of the Kwazulu-Natal High Court,
Pietermaritzburg, agreed that the absence of written authorisa-
tion in this case constituted an irregularity, but this did not
automatically result in a failure of justice or an unfair trial (paras
[10] [11]). And in this particular matter, the irregularity was not of
such a nature that it per se amounted to a failure of justice (para
[14]). This finding was based on the following reasons: oral
authorisation was indeed obtained from the acting DPP to
proceed with the prosecution of the applicant; the applicant did
not protest before or during the trial about the absence of written
authorisation; and to ‘hold that the absence of written authorisa-
tion in those circumstances per se amounted to a failure of
justice, irrespective of whether the applicant was prejudiced
thereby, would be contrary to the public interest and will bring the
administration of justice in disrepute’ (para [14]).
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